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Policy Evaluation in the EU: The Challenges of
Linking Ex Ante and Ex Post Appraisal
Stijn Smismans∗
The EU’s new approach to policy evaluation is characterised by a focus on closing the poli-
cy cycle (linking ex ante and ex post appraisal) and by applying evaluation to all types of
policy intervention, whether expenditure or regulatory policy. This article analyses the main
features and challenges of this new approach. It first studies the conceptual and interdisci-
plinary challenge of such an encompassing approach to evaluation. It then assesses the new
approach in the light of four key objectives of ex ante and ex post appraisal; ensuring evi-
dence and learning; accountability, transparency and participation; policy coherence; and
reducing the regulatory burden.
I. Introduction
Over the last two decades, policy evaluation has at-
tracted increased attention (and resources) from pol-
icy-makers, practitioners and academic scholars
within many developed countries and international
organisations.1 This trend is confirmed by the recent
adoption (in 2014) of an encompassing Framework
for Regulatory Policy Evaluation by the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD).2The EuropeanUnion (EU) too has strength-
ened its evaluation capacity over the last twodecades,
and has made evaluation a key feature of its recent
Smart Regulation agenda. Yet, policy evaluation in
the EU has hardly been studied.3 As evaluation is in-
creasingly expected to play amore central role in Eu-
ropean governance, such marginalisation cannot be
justified. This Special Issue of the EJRR aims to ad-
dress this gap in the literature and to bring the top-
ic of evaluation closer to the mainstream of EU reg-
ulatory studies and EU studies in general.
In this introductory article of the Special Issue I
will set out the main features of the EU’s new ap-
proach to policy evaluation,4 and will analyse its
main challenges for both practitioners and scholars.
The new approach to policy evaluation is mainly
characterised by applying evaluation to all policy ar-
eas (extending it in particular from expenditure to
regulatory policies), and by strengthening the link
between ex ante and ex post evaluation. By extend-
ing theparametersof evaluationbeyondexpenditure
policy and focusing on the entire policy cycle, the
first challenge of this new approach is both a con-
ceptual and interdisciplinary one. Section II analy-
ses howdifferent practitioner and academic commu-
nities have dealt with ex ante and ex post evaluation
in a rather siloed fashion while using similar con-
cepts in different ways. In the spirit of an encom-
∗ Stijn Smismans is Professor of EU law at the School of Law and
Politics and Director of the Centre for European Law and Gover-
nance (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence) at Cardiff University.
The research leading to this article has received funding from the
European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh
Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement n.
313642–LASI (“Law, science and interests in European policy-
making”). I would like to thank Rachel Minto for research assis-
tance, and Emanuela Bozzini, Claudio Radaelli, Steven Højlund
and Lut Mergaert for useful comments on an earlier draft of this
article.
1 E.g. for an overview of 21 countries and three international
organisations, see Jan-Eric Furubo, Ray C. Rist and Rolf. Sandahl
(eds.), International atlas of evaluation (New Brunswick: NJ Trans-
action, 2002).
2 For more detail, see Anne Meuwese in this Special Issue.
3 There are rare exceptions, mainly in the field of structural funds
policy, e.g. Elliot Stern, “Evaluation policy in the European Union
and its institutions” New Directions for Evaluation (2009), pp. 67
et sqq.; Carlos Mendez and John Bachtler, “Administrative reform
and unintended consequences: an assessment of the EU cohesion
policy ‘audit explosion’”, 18 Journal of European Public Policy
(2011), pp. 746 et sqq.; Julian Hoerner and Paul Stephenson,
“Theoretical Perspectives on Approaches to Policy Evaluation in
the EU: The Case of Cohesion Policy” 90 Public Administration
(2012), pp. 699 et sqq. Federico Iannacci, Tony Cornford, Antonio
Cordella and Francesco Grillo, “Evaluating monitoring systems in
the European social fund context: a sociotechnical approach”, 33
Evaluation Review (2009), pp. 419 et sqq.; and Steven Højlund,
“Evaluation use in evaluation systems – the case of the European
Commission”, 20 Evaluation (2014), pp. 428 et sqq.
4 The broader historical background of EU policy evaluation is set
out further by Højlund in this Special Issue.
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passing approach to evaluation, section II will pro-
vide conceptual clarification and set out the interdis-
ciplinary challenges. Section III analyses the main
features of the EU’s new approach to evaluation. Sec-
tion IV elaborates the main challenges of this new
approach in relation to four key objectives of evalu-
ation: ensuring evidence and learning; accountabil-
ity, transparency and participation; policy coher-
ence; and reducing the regulatory burden. By
analysing the current state of affairs of both ex ante
and ex post evaluation in relation to these four key
objectives, thegaps andchallengesof the encompass-
ing approach are identified. By focusing critically on
the objectives of evaluation, the analysis also ad-
dresses the politics of evaluation. The literature on
evaluation has been criticised for focusing on assess-
ing the effectiveness of evaluation tools and devel-
oping the most appropriate methodology, while es-
chewing analysis of the interests and politics of pol-
icy evaluation.5 Analysing the objectives of evalua-
tion allows raising questions about the appropriate
institutional setting, the main actors, interests and
ideology at stake in the EU’s new approach to policy
evaluation.
II. Conceptual and Interdisciplinary
Clarification: Evaluation, Appraisal,
Audit and Enforcement
1. The Divide in the Literature Between
Ex Ante Appraisal and Ex Post
Evaluation
The European Commission defines evaluation as “a
critical evidence-based judgement of whether EU ac-
tion(s) has met the needs it aimed to satisfy and ac-
tually achieved its expected effects.”6 All evaluations
are supposed to look at effectiveness (do the verified
effects correspond to the original objectives?), effi-
ciency (were the costs justified?), relevance (do the
original objectives still correspond to theneeds of the
EU?), coherence (internally and with other interven-
tions with similar objectives), and EU added value
(compared to what could be achieved by Member
States). In official EU discourse, “evaluation” normal-
ly refers to ex post (i.e. retrospective) evaluation,
which can be interim (i.e. at the mid-term of an ini-
tiative), final (at its conclusion), or ex post in the strict
sense (which can take place several years after the in-
tervention has finished). The Commission talks
about ex ante evaluation only in relation to expendi-
ture programmes. Ex ante evaluation is legally re-
quired under the EU’s Financial Regulation to assess
the cost-effectiveness of all proposed expenditure
programmes/actions for the Union budget.
In general, though, Commission documents on
evaluation only deal with retrospective evaluation.7
Moreover, the Commission’s well established system
of ex ante appraisal for regulatory action and main
initiatives, namely the system of integrated impact
assessments (IIA), is not usually referred to as eval-
uation. The divide between ex ante impact assess-
ments (ofmainly regulatory action), and ex post eval-
uation (of mainly expenditure programmes) is also
partially reflectedwithin theorganisational structure
of the Commission, both at the level of the Secretari-
at General and the Directorates General (DGs). The
Secretariat General has separate units for ex ante and
ex post evaluation, and DGs focusing on regulatory
intervention tend to copy this pattern although in
DGs focusing on expenditure policies, programme
units deal often both with ex ante and ex post evalu-
ation.
This discursive and institutional divide at the EU
level reflects a wider gap between policy and acade-
mic communities which deal, on the one hand, with
ex ante regulatory assessment and, on the other hand
with evaluation, mainly focused on ex post assess-
ment of, in particular, expenditure projects and pro-
grammes. Scholars and practitioners dealing with
evaluation constitute their own community, distinct
from political science, regulation studies, and even
public policy analysis.8 There is also hardly any link
between this literature and EU studies, except for
somemore recent studies (particularly in the field of
5 Melvin M. Mark, Leslie J. Cooksy and William M.K. Trochim,
“Evaluation Policy: an introduction and overview”, 123 New
Directions in Evaluation (2009), pp. 3 et sqq.. For a similar cri-
tique of the literature on ex ante appraisal missing out on the
“policy and politics” of appraisal, see John Turnpenny, Claudio
M. Radaelli, Andrew Jordan and Klaus Jacob, “The policy and
politics of policy appraisal: emerging trends and new direction”,
16 Journal of European Public Policy (2009), pp. 640 et sqq.
6 Commission Communication “Strengthening the foundations of
Smart Regulation – improving evaluation”, COM(2013) 686
final, at p. 7.
7 With the exception of the specific guidelines for ex ante evalua-
tion on expenditure programmes. Commission, “Ex Ante Evalua-
tion. A practical guide for preparing proposals for expenditure
programmes”, DG Budget, 10 December 2001.
8 See also Emanuela Bozzini and Jo Hunt in this Special Issue.
EJRR 1|20158 Symposium on Policy Evaluation in the EU
cohesion policy).9 The evaluation community has its
own journals such as Evaluation, Evaluation Review,
andNewDirections in Evaluation, and networks such
as the European Evaluation Society. The focus of this
community is on developing the best methodology
for evaluation, particularly for project and pro-
gramme evaluations. Writing within this communi-
ty, Mark et al. criticise that evaluation policy (i.e. the
way in which government, international organisa-
tions or private actors provide a set of rules (formal
or informal) that shapeevaluationpractices)hasbeen
understudied in the mainstream evaluation litera-
ture. 10
At the same time, a flourishing, although not very
large community of scholars has evolved around is-
sues of ex ante appraisal. Ex ante regulatory appraisal
in particular is a key topic of research both in plan-
ning studies and in regulatory studies.While the for-
mer also constitutes its own research community,
with specially dedicated journals, the latter fits more
naturally with mainstream political science and pol-
icy analysis, given its focus on regulatory interven-
tion, and placing the topic in the context of wider
questions about better regulation and the quality of
law-making.11 The latter perspective has also
brought the topic closer to the mainstream of EU
studies, with journals such as this one paying con-
siderable attention to ex ante impact assessments as
a key regulatory instrument of the European regula-
tory state.
As the EU evolves towards an evaluation approach
that encompasses both expenditure and regulatory
policy, and aims to link ex ante and ex post evalua-
tion, it is time to bridge the gap between these two
scholarly communities.
Conceptually it is important to note that the ex
post (mainlyexpenditure) literaturehaspreferred the
concept of evaluation, although appraisal and assess-
ment also figure in it. The ex ante (mainly regulato-
ry) literature tends instead to use the concepts of ap-
praisal andassessment, andhardly everuses the term
evaluation. There is no strong semantic reason for
this choice. According to the Oxford online dictio-
nary, “appraisal” is “an act of assessing something or
someone”, while “evaluation” is defined as “the mak-
ing of a judgment about the amount, number, or val-
ue of something; assessment”. Itmight be argued that
“evaluation” includesmoreof a (final) judgement call,
and therefore seems more naturally ex post. Howev-
er, both ex ante appraisal and ex post evaluation
mechanisms stress that they only provide the evi-
dence for decisions and judgement calls to be made
at amore political level afterwards. At the same time,
any gathering of information, whether ex ante or ex
post, will include some assessment and judgement
on the relevance of information, etc. From this per-
spective, this article and this Special Issue use the
concepts of evaluation and appraisal as synonymous,
preferring a broad definition of evaluation and ap-
praisal as including both ex ante and ex post process-
es. A similarly broad use of the concept of evaluation
is proposed in the OECD’s new Framework for Reg-
ulatory Policy Evaluation.
Having proposed a broad definition of evaluation
as a way to make the ex ante and ex post research
communities meet, it is also worth indicating that,
despite the gapbetween these research communities,
there is considerable common ground in these two
categories of literature, both regarding current state
of play and challenges. Adelle et al. distinguish be-
tween four types of research on policy appraisal.12
While they focus on ex ante appraisal, the same cat-
egorisation and conclusions can in fact be applied to
research on ex post evaluation. Type 1 research deals
with the design of appraisal/evaluation, focusing on
tools and methods; while type 2 aims to assess the
performance of ex ante and ex post appraisal. Type 1
and type 2 constitute by far the bulk of literature on
both ex ante and ex post appraisal, and are partially
produced by practitioners and consultancies, often
with the aim to advise policy-making on the best way
to implement an appraisal. Type 3 research focuses
on evidence utilization and whether appraisal leads
to policy change via processes of learning. Type 4
takes the investigation further by addressing the re-
al motivations of policy-makers and the interests at
stake in policy evaluation. Unlike types 1 and 2which
9 Highlighted above, supra note 3.
10 Melvin M. Mark, Leslie J. Cooksy and William M.K. Trochim,
“Evaluation Policy: an introduction and overview”, 123 New
Directions in Evaluation (2009), pp. 3 et sqq.
11 Although the topic is only slowly finding its way to the main-
stream of public policy. As Turpnenny et al. note, it is telling that
no mainstream public policy textbook covers policy appraisal in
much detail. John Turnpenny, Claudio M. Radaelli, Andrew
Jordan and Klaus Jacob, “The policy and politics of policy ap-
praisal: emerging trends and new direction”, 16 Journal of Euro-
pean Public Policy (2009), pp. 640 et sqq., at p. 641.
12 Camille Adelle, Andrew Jordan and John Turnpenny, “Proceeding
in parallel or drifting apart? A systematic review of policy ap-
praisal research and practices”, 30 Environment and Planning C:
Government and Policy (2012), pp. 401 et sqq.
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for a long time have been inspired by the “technical-
rationalmodel” (based on the assumption that sound
evidence could be gathered neutrally and then pre-
sented to political decision-makers), types 3 and 4 are
more inspired by a post-positivist understanding of
knowledge production and knowledge use in policy-
making. Although types 3 and 4 are even less devel-
oped for ex post evaluation than for ex ante evalua-
tion, there is a striking amount of common ground
in the ex ante and ex post research of these types. In
relation to the EU, for instance, Dunlop et al identi-
fy four main usages of IIAs, based on an analysis of
implementation practice,13 while Højlund identifies
10 different usages of ex post evaluation in the EU
(five during evaluation, five with the final results of
evaluation).14 Although developed separately, these
analyses share common inspiration in the literature
on knowledge use, which regularly distinguishes the
key categories of knowledge use as instrumental
(problem solving), strategic (to defend pre-defined
positions) and symbolic (to strengthen legitimacy).15
As will be analysed further in section III, the new
approach to policy evaluation, such as that advocat-
ed by the Commission and reflected in broader eval-
uation trends nationally and internationally, invites
further interaction between the ex ante and ex post
research communities as it poses similar challenges
for them.
2. Audit and Enforcement
Having proposed a broad concept of evaluation, it is
important to delineate the concept from affiliated
terms, one that ismore closely related to expenditure
evaluation and another that relates more to regulato-
ry evaluation, namely audit and enforcement.
Audithas traditionally focusedon financial report-
ing and control over compliance with the rules, thus
ensuring effectiveness of management and internal
control systems. The last two decades have been wit-
ness to a boom in monitoring and auditing systems
in the public sector, whether organised internally or
externally. This evolution has been labelled as the
emergence of an “audit society”.16 As will be further
shown below and in Steven Højlund’s contribution
to this Special Issue, the EU has considerably
strengthened its audit and monitoring regime since
the 1990s, particularly in the light of legitimacy con-
cerns. Yet, while increased accountability is welcome
in any democracy, some have also argued that the au-
dit society is based on a total lack of trust, which not
onlyundermines learningbut in the endevendemoc-
racy, as democracy is a trust-based system in which
the electorate entrusts themaking of public policy to
its elected representatives.17 That dense compliance
and auditing rules stifle learning is also shown in the
EU context.18However,more recently there has been
a shift from compliance audits to performance au-
dits, or at least performance assessments comple-
menting compliance assessments within the audit-
ing process. Performance audit goes beyond the tra-
ditional legality and regularity questions of sound fi-
nancial management and looks into effectiveness
and whether objectives have been achieved. Howev-
er, this means that the distinction between audit and
evaluation has become increasingly blurred. Accord-
ing to the European Commission similar knowledge
and skills are involved inperformance audit and eval-
uation, and the main difference is the context and
purpose of the activities. Audit remains institution-
ally implemented by institutions set up for financial
auditing and has a stronger focus onmethodology to
assess the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of
how the work was done to achieve the objectives,
while evaluation also looks into policy impact, con-
sidering why something has occurred and the com-
parison of alternatives.19 Exploring this further, in
this Special Issue Paul Stephenson analyses how the
European Court of Auditors (the key EU institution
13 The four main usages are political, instrumental, communicative
and perfunctory. Claire Dunlop, Martino Maggetti, Claudio
Radaelli and Duncan Russel, “The Many Uses of Regulatory
Impact Assessment: A Meta-Analysis of EU and UK Cases”, 6
Regulation and Governance (2012), pp. 23 et sqq.
14 Steven Højlund, “Evaluation use in evaluation systems – the case
of the European Commission”, 20 Evaluation (2014), pp. 428 et
sqq.
15 Lorna Schrefler, “Reflections on the different roles of expertise in
regulatory policy making”, in Monika Ambrus, Karin Arts, Ellen
Hey, Helena Raulus (eds), The Role of ‘Experts' in International
and European Decision-Making ProcessesAdvisors, Decision
Makers or Irrelevant Actors?, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2014), pp. 63 et sqq..
16 Michael Power ,The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997).
17 Jan Klabbers, “The virtues of expertise”, in Monika Ambrus, Karin
Arts, Ellen Hey, Helena Raulus (eds), The Role of ‘Experts' in
International and European Decision-Making Processes. Advisors,
Decision Makers or Irrelevant Actors, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), pp. 82 et sqq., at p. 87.
18 Steven Højlund in this Special Issue, and Mendez and Bachtler,
“Administrative reform”, supra note 3.
19 Commission, “Public Consultation on Commission Guidelines for
Evaluation”, November 2013, available on the Internet at <http://
ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/consultation/index_en
.htm>, (last accessed on 20 May 2014), at p. 13.
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to ensure that the books are sound) has more recent-
ly engaged in performance auditing, particularly
through theproductionof “special reports”, thus carv-
ing itself a place in the EU’s institutional landscape
of policy evaluation.
While performance audit has blurred the line be-
tween the audit and evaluation of EU initiatives in-
volving the Union budget, the assessment of perfor-
mance of regulatory action has focused on the en-
forcement of regulatory acts at Member State level.
Available data are often limited to information on the
transposition of EU directives, while information
about implementation on the ground remains scarce.
Also, the academic literature on compliance in theEU
has focused on the transposition of directives, deal-
ing particularly with the identification of explanato-
ry “goodness of fit” variables at national level to ex-
plain success or failure of transposition.20 However,
so far, this literature, like the broader Europeaniza-
tion literature,21 has not made a link with the debate
on evaluation. It has focused on explaining national
diversity in relation to European integration, but has
not conceptualised the assessment of national imple-
mentation as part of an EU evaluation process that
can feed back into newEuropean initiatives. This gap
between “compliance” and “evaluation” is not only an
academic one, but is equally present in the EU’s in-
stitutional set up.While evaluation has long been the
remit ofDGBudget, enforcement has always been the
responsibility of the more legally oriented Secretari-
at General of the Commission, linked with the legal
service when enforcement action is taken.
In this Special Issue, Melanie Smith breaks the
barrier between enforcement and evaluation. The
Commission data gathered on enforcement are in-
deed a good starting point to build up evaluation ca-
pacity in relation to regulatory policy. At the same
time, Smith argues that the strengthening of evalua-
tion policy canmake the Commission’s enforcement
policy more accountable.
III. Towards an EU Policy Evaluation
Culture
1. Key Features of the New Approach to
Evaluation
Evaluation is by no means a novelty in EU policy-
making. The EU has engaged in project and pro-
gramme evaluation for several decades now. Howev-
er, evaluation has been focused on expenditure poli-
cies in particular, such as structural funds, research
and development, the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) and development aid. While initial evaluation
practices developed ad hoc within different DGs, the
increase in the EU budget and EU expenditure dur-
ing the 1990s, as well as instances of corruption and
the legitimacy crisis related to the resignation of the
Santer Commission, led to a more systematic ap-
proach to evaluation in the European Commission.
Legal requirements and control were tightened to en-
sure financial accountability.22
Evaluation became centrally enshrined in bud-
getary allocations and the seven year financial pro-
gramming cycle. Evaluation standards were devel-
oped by DG Budget in 1999 (and revised in 2004) to
guide DGs in their evaluation work, particularly
whenoutsourcing evaluation to external consultants.
All DGs were supposed to develop their evaluation
capacity, through the establishment of evaluation
units in particular. However, as Steven Højlund ar-
gues later in this Special Issue, many DGs (particu-
larly those not involved in expenditure policy) con-
sidered evaluation a formality they had to comply
with, rather than a useful exercise they could learn
from.
More recently, the European Commission has
aimed towards a reorientation of its evaluation poli-
cy. The reorientation of evaluation policy was first
set out in the 2007CommissionCommunication “Re-
sponding to Strategic Needs: Reinforcing the use of
evaluation”,23andwas subsequentlygivenmore clout
by the embedding of evaluation in the broader Bet-
20 Gerda Falkner, Oliver Treib, Miriam Hartlapp and Simone Leiber,
Complying with Europe. EU harmonisation and soft law in the
Member States, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005);
Thomas König and Brooke Luetgert, “Troubles with Transposition?
Explaining Trends in Member-State Notification and Delayed
Transposition of EU Directives”, 39 British Journal of Political
Science (2009), pp. 163 et sqq.; Ellen Mastenbroek and Michael
Kaeding, “Europeanization Beyond the Goodness of Fit: Domestic
Politics in the Forefront”, Comparative European Politics (2006),
pp. 331 et sqq.; and Esther Versluis “Even Rules, Uneven Prac-
tices: Opening the ‘Black Box’ of EU law in action”, 30 West
European Politics (2007),pp. 50 et sqq..
21 Keith Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of
Europeanisation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and
Paolo Graziano and Maarten Vink, Europeanization: new re-
search agendas (Palgrave, 2008)
22 Højlund in this Special Issue.
23 Commission Communication “Responding to Strategic Needs:
Reinforcing the use of evaluation”, SEC (2007) 2013.
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ter Regulation agenda. The turn from “Better Regu-
lation” to “Smart Regulation” in 201024 was precise-
ly characterised by the argument that “better/smart
regulation” should be taken into account throughout
the entire policy-cycle and not just at the start of it
(where most better regulation tools had up to then
been focused ). This means in particular that ex post
evaluation should gain a more central place in the
policy-making process and should be linked to the ex
ante assessment of new policy intervention. The cen-
trality of evaluation to the policy-making process in
general was exemplified by the fact that the Secre-
tariat General of the Commission, instead of DGBud-
get, became the leading unit responsible for evalua-
tion in 2009. The Commission’s 2013 Communica-
tion “Strengthening the foundations of Smart Regu-
lation – improving evaluation”25 reiterates this ap-
proach in catchy terms by talking about the “evalu-
ate first” principle, and promoting an “evaluation cul-
ture” in the Commission, while more concrete pro-
posals were to be proposed in new evaluation guide-
lines. The new draft evaluation guidelines were pre-
sented for public consultation in November 2013.26
At the time of writing this article (January 2015) the
final new evaluation guidelines have not yet been
made publicly available. The start of the new Junck-
er Commission in November 2014, as well as the par-
allel redrafting and consultation process on the new
impact assessment guidelines27 may explain the de-
lay. The draft evaluation guidelines confirm the new,
more comprehensive approach to evaluation. Draft-
ed by the Secretariat General of the Commission they
also read as a more hierarchical document to be fol-
lowed by all DGs,28 compared to the existing evalua-
tion guidelines of 2004, which were drafted by DG
Budget as a “Practical Guide for the Commission Ser-
vices”, by “presenting practical solutions and good
practices”.29
The key features of the new approach to evalua-
tion resulting from the three Communications (2007
“Reinforcing Evaluation”, 2010 “Smart Regulation”,
2013 “Improving evaluation”) and draft guidelines
(2013), are the following:
1) Evaluation has to be applied to all types of EU in-
tervention; expenditure policy as well as regulato-
ry intervention, including soft law measures.
While the idea to apply evaluation beyond expen-
diture policies goes back more than a decade,30 it
is only in the 2007 and 2010 Communications that
concrete measures are proposed for a more sys-
tematic application of evaluation to regulatory in-
tervention.
2) The “evaluate first” principle locates evaluation
firmly within the policy cycle. New EU interven-
tion can only be taken after an assessment of past
action has been made. While evaluation of expen-
diturepolicyhas longbeen linked to the sevenyear
financial programme cycle, the 2007 Communica-
tion sets the Commission on track to fit evaluation
of all its action into its strategic planning and pro-
gramming cycle. Most importantly, ex post evalu-
ation should feed back into the EU system of ex
ante impact assessments, which has been solidly
established since 2003.
3) The Commission’s emphasis upon the place of
evaluation in the policy cycle goes hand in hand
with the embedding of evaluation within the
Smart Regulation agenda, and the “REFIT pro-
gramme” in particular. As part of the Smart Reg-
ulation agenda, the Commission initiated a Regu-
latory Fitness and Performance Programme (RE-
FIT) in December 201231 in order to review the en-
tire stock of EU legislation; to identify burdens,
inconsistencies, gapsor ineffectivemeasures,with
the aim to ensure “a simple, clear, stable and pre-
dictable regulatory framework for businesses,
workers and citizens.”32
Evaluation has always had a “value for money”
character. Control over the implementation of ex-
penditure policies would ensure a certain level of
24 Commission Communication “Smart Regulation in the European
Union”, COM(2010) 543 final.
25 Commission Communication “Strengthening the foundations of
Smart Regulation – improving evaluation”, supra note 6.
26 Commission, “Public Consultation on Commission Guidelines for
Evaluation”, supra note 19.
27 Commission, “2014 Revision of the European Commission
Impact Assessment Guidelines. Public Consultation document”, 1
July 2014 , available at <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/
impact/consultation_2014/index_en.htm> (last accessed on 30
September 2014).
28 Although the guidelines do not provide for any systematic screen-
ing of DGs on whether they respect these guidelines, in a way
that exists through the Impact Assessment Board.
29 Commission, “Evaluating EU Activities. Practical Guide for the
Commission Services”, DG Budget, July 2004.
30 E.g. Commission Communication “Focus on results: strengthening
evaluation of Commission activities”, SEC(2000)1051.
31 Commission Communication “EU Regulatory Fitness”, COM
(2012) 746 final.
32 Commission Communication “Regulatory Fitness and Perfor-
mance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps”, COM(2013) 685 final, at
p. 2.
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accountability regarding whether citizens had got
what they paid for. However, in the Smart Regu-
lation context, the value for money argument de-
velops from ex post accountability to making use
of ex post evaluation to decide on the desirability
of future action, particularly in the context of a
regulatory framework that aims to be as “smart”
and “thin” as possible. The Commission considers
evaluation a “key tool” in its Smart Regulation
agenda, not only to ensure better (quality) regula-
tion but also to avoid regulatory burden: “Evalu-
ating the effectiveness and efficiency of EU legis-
lation will improve the quality of policy-making
and help to identify new opportunities to simpli-
fy legislation and reduce administrative bur-
dens.”33Oras the 2013EvaluationCommunication
states it: “There can be a tendency to look forward
and focus on new initiatives. But changes are cost-
ly and take time to implement – so they need to
be justified and greater attention needs to be paid
to looking back before moving forward.”34
4) Finally, by placing evaluation centrally in the pol-
icycycle forallEUaction,expostevaluationshould
ensure above all policy learning, and not just (fi-
nancial) programme or project learning. Evalua-
tion should not only be the remit of a small num-
ber of administrators directly involved in a specif-
ic programme or project, but should feed back in-
to the political decision-making process. This un-
derpins the Commission’s attention to ensuring
better communication and transparency so as to
increase the number of actors that can be involved
in this learning process, whether stakeholders or
other institutional actors.
Thesekey features of thenewapproach topolicy eval-
uation pose important challenges to the EU’s evalu-
ation systemasdeveloped so far,while inviting a clos-
er link between the ex ante and ex post research com-
munities.
First, applying evaluation to all types of policy in-
terventionmeans a particular challenge for regulato-
ry policy. While ex post evaluation is particularly de-
veloped for expenditure policy, the tools andmethod-
ology for ex post regulatory policy aremuch less read-
ily available. Although lessons can be learnt from ex-
penditure policy, tools andmethodology cannot sim-
ply been transposed to ex post regulatory policy as-
sessment. At the same time, the challenge in terms
of tools and methodology is not limited to regulato-
ry ex post evaluation. For both ex ante and ex post ap-
praisal the shift from project and programme assess-
ment to broader policy appraisal invites reflection on
new methodology, as existing tools may not be suf-
ficient to draw broader policy conclusions.35.
Secondly, the “evaluate first” principle and focus
on the policy cycle implies a major challenge to cur-
rent practices. For expenditure programmes, the
cyclical process is well established, with ex ante, mid-
term, final and ex post evaluations constructed
around the Commission’s Activity Based Manage-
ment system and budget cycles. However, even for
expenditure policy, data from ex post evaluation do
not always systematically feed back into the current
type of ex ante financial evaluation. Moreover, for
regulatory policy, the idea of a policy cycle is more
an abstract notion than a reality. There is neither a
systematic cyclical process, nor a broad availability
of ex post data on regulatory assessment that could
feed into new initiatives.
Finally, the increased focus on policy level ap-
praisal, as well as the embedding of evaluation with-
in the Smart Regulation agenda, make evaluation in-
trinsically more political. This raises questions for
the EU about what it really aims to achieve through
evaluation and how it can translate this institution-
ally. For academic research it raises increasingly type
3 and type 4 research questions about the interests
at stake, and the political and strategic use of ap-
praisal.
2. Key Tools Developed so far to Realise
the New Approach to Evaluation
While the Commission Communications (set out
above) define the key features of the new approach
to evaluation, there is a long way to go before such
an “evaluation culture” is really established. So far
the Commission has focused on three key initiatives:
The first key initiative has been to include evalu-
ation within the Commission’s strategic planning
and to make the results of ex post evaluation more
readily available. The 2004 Evaluation Guidelines
33 Commission Communication “Smart Regulation in the European
Union”, supra note 25, at p. 4.
34 Commission Communication “Strengthening the foundations of
Smart Regulation – improving evaluation”, supra note 6, at p. 5.
35 Stern, “Evaluation policy in the European Union”, supra note 3.
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suggest that each DG adopts an annual evaluation
plan and amulti-annual evaluation programme.36 In
practice these are integrated in eachDGsannualman-
agement plan. An overall future evaluation pro-
gramme is then set out, previously byDGBudget and
now by the Secretariat General, to plan Commission
evaluations against the strategic priorities of the
Commission. The 2010 Smart Regulation Communi-
cation promised to publish planned evaluations of
legislative action on a specific website to facilitate in-
put. However, while all DGs now provide an annual
evaluation plan, there remains significant room for
improved longer-term planning, more transparency
and greater advancewarning andpredictability.37An
overview of planned evaluations is now available on
the Commission’s evaluation website,38 as well as in
an annex to the Commission Work Programme as
part of the overview of REFIT activities. Yet, some
DGs have not looked further than a year ahead.More-
over, the overview does not provide links to informa-
tion on exact dates for tender, and does not provide
opportunities for input. Further information is dis-
persed onDGwebsites, but the available information
is inconsistent. As far as the publication of ex post
evaluation reports is concerned, there is diversity in
the amount of information available on DGwebsites.
While the creation of a central database of evalua-
tion files on the Commission’s evaluation website39
is an important improvement, the database is not ex-
haustive. 40
The second key initiative of the new approach re-
lates to attempts to link ex post evaluation and the
system of ex ante integrated impact assessments.
Since its inception in 2003, the system of IIA pro-
vided two links with evaluation as traditionally de-
fined within the EU. First of all it clarified the rela-
tionship between IIAs and existing practice of ex
ante evaluation required for expenditure initiatives.
When an IIA is applied to certain proposals involv-
ing budgetary expenditure, the IIA will incorporate
those elements specific to ex ante expenditure eval-
uation, particularly on cost-effectiveness issues, in
addition to the full assessment of economic, environ-
mental and social impacts an IIA normally pro-
vides.41 Secondly, it provided a linkwith ex post eval-
uation by requiring impact assessments to set out in-
dicators for future retrospective evaluations of the
new initiative. Vice versa, ex post evaluation is ex-
pected to rely on IIAs and these indicators to identi-
fy why and how an intervention was supposed to
work in order to then assess implementation.42How-
ever, the IIA system provided little incentives to in-
clude information from previous ex post evaluations
in impact assessments. Setting out the data sources
that IIAs may use, the 2009 IIA Guidelines state that
“information may include monitoring or evaluation
reports from previous or similar programmes”
(stress added). However, there is neither a structur-
al obligation nor a procedural incentive to do so. Ac-
cording to the European Impact Assessment Board
(IAB) only around one out of six IIAs in 2013 relied
on (or used) ex post evaluation results (which is, how-
ever, already an improvement compared to around
one out of ten in 2010).43 Given the Smart Regula-
tion focus on the policy cycle, the IAB has now com-
mitted to screening more systematically whether
IIAs make use of data from retrospective evalua-
tions.44 The new draft IIA guidelines presented in
2014 provide for a further structural linking of ex
ante and ex post assessment. According to these
guidelines “embedded in the policy cycle” has be-
come one of the eight core principles of the IIA sys-
tem. While confirming the previous commitment
that each IIA should provide a monitoring and eval-
36 European Commission, “Evaluating EU Activities”, at p. 30.
37 Commission Communication “Strengthening the foundations of
Smart Regulation – improving evaluation”, supra note 6, at p. 6.
38 Commission, “Evaluation”, 12 November 2014, available on the
Internet at <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/index
_en.htm> (last accessed on 20 May 2014).
39 Commission, “Search evaluation results”, 24 July 2014, available
on the Internet at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/
search/search.do (last accessed on 21 January 2015).
40 How representative the database is for the entirety of evaluations
is difficult to assess. For sure, the database seems to focus on
outsourced evaluations, leaving roughly 20% of internal evalua-
tions uncovered.
41 Commission Communication “Impact Assessment”,
COM(2002)276. Not all IIAs include such financial ex ante
evaluation as the initiative may not engage the Union budget.
Vice versa, ex ante financial evaluation continues to exist as a
separate process for expenditure actions for which no IIA is
required. However, ex ante evaluation is now predominantly
conducted in the context of impact assessments. See Commis-
sion, “Public Consultation on Commission Guidelines for Evalua-
tion”, supra note 19, at p. 16.
42 Commission, “Public Consultation on Commission Guidelines for
Evaluation”, supra note 19, at p. 7.
43 European Impact Assessment Board, “Annual Report for 2013”,
available on the Internet at <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/
impact/key_docs/docs/iab_report_2013_en.pdf> (last accessed on
21 January 2015 at p. 7.
44 European Impact Assessment Board, “Annual Report for 2012”,
available on the Internet at <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/
impact/key_docs/docs/iab_report_2012_en_final.pdf> (last ac-
cessed on 21 January 2015), at p. 27.
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uation framework for the future, it now also states
that the “impact assessment report should present,
and feed into the analysis, the lessons drawn from
any relevant retrospective evaluations, fitness
checks, implementation experience and infringe-
ment activity. When no retrospective evaluations
have been carried out, the impact assessment report
should clarify why it is still considered opportune to
get ahead with a policy initiative.”45 Yet, unlike the
current requirement for each IIA report to include a
separate section setting out future evaluation and
monitoring indicators, the guidelines do not add an
additional requirement for each IIA report to include
also a separate section on assessing data from previ-
ous retrospective evaluations. This gives the Com-
mission more leeway, and makes procedural review
by the IAB on this issue a bit more difficult. It sug-
gests that such data would need to be taken into ac-
count where relevant throughout the IIA report, al-
though it is more specifically referred to in relation
to the first stage of an IIA, namely the definition of
the problem, forwhich the draft guidelines state that
“key input to this assessment will be any retrospec-
tive evaluations or fitness checks of relevant frame-
works already in place.”46
The third key initiative is the development of tools
that allow evaluation beyond the project and pro-
gramme level. So far the new toolkit for evaluation
at policy level has focused particularly upon the eval-
uation of particular policy areas or industrial sectors
and is strongly linked with the Smart Regulation
agenda and REFIT programme. Traditionally Com-
mission evaluations have been conducted on individ-
ual interventions (programmes, legislative acts),
which may themselves have involved a range of
projects or actions. The Smart Regulation Commu-
nication of 2010, instead, proposed the tool of “fit-
ness checks”,47 which aim at a comprehensive evalu-
ation of a policy area (i.e. the evaluation of a group
of related interventions that are linked by a common
set of objectives). Fitness checks help to give higher
political leverage to evaluation, as they extend be-
yond the tiny network of a single regulatory inter-
vention. Most importantly, though, they are suitable
for the purposes of embedding evaluationwithin the
Smart Regulation agenda. A fitness check should as-
sess whether the regulatory framework for a policy
sector is fit for purpose and provide the basis for pol-
icy conclusions on the future of the relevant regula-
tory framework. It should identify any excessive reg-
ulatory burdens, overlaps, gaps, inconsistencies
and/or obsolete measures which may have appeared
over time, and help to identify the cumulative im-
pact of legislation.48The first fitness checkswere car-
ried out as a pilot exercise during the period
2010-2013 for policy areas falling under the remit of
five DGs (ENV, EMPL, MOVE, SANCO and ENTR).
By the end of 2014, the Commission had carried out
or launched 47 fitness checks or evaluations specifi-
cally aimed at measuring regulatory burden, most of
these in the areas of environment (11), enterprise and
industry (8) and employment (5).49 The new Junck-
er Commission has planned nine new fitness checks
for 2015.50
In order to evaluate beyond the project or pro-
gramme level, the Commission has also run a pilot
with a new assessment tool, namely the Cumulative
Cost Assessment (CCA).51 Like fitness checks, CCA
aims at evaluation at the policy level and at assess-
ing a regulatory framework. However, unlike fitness
checks, the focus is not on the regulatory framework
in a particular policy area, but on all regulatory in-
terventions that create costs for a particular sector of
industry. Focusing only on measuring costs, CCA
does not constitute an evaluation on its own, but is
said to provide evidence for evaluation, fitness
checks and IIAs.52 Yet, like fitness checks, it is an
evaluation tool that is particularly fitting for the pur-
pose of lightening the regulatory burden under the
REFIT programme. After the first pilot (in the sector
of steel and aluminium), the new Commission has
promised to finish three further CCAs in 2015 (in the
sectors of forest, chemical, and ceramics and glass
industry).
45 Commission, “2014 Revision of the European Commission
Impact Assessment Guidelines”, supra note 27, at p. 29.
46 Ibid., at p. 10.
47 Fitness checks constitute just one of the tools of the wider REFIT
programme.
48 Commission, “Public Consultation on Commission Guidelines for
Evaluation”, supra note 19, at p. 16.
49 Commission Communication “Regulatory Fitness and Perfor-
mance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps”, COM(2013) 685 final, at
p. 7.
50 Commission Communication “Commission Work Programme
2015. A new start”, COM(2014) 910 final, at Annex 3.
51 For a detailed assessment of the new CCA tool, based on analysis
of the two pilot exercises, see Lorna Schrefler, Giacomo Luchetta
and Felice Simonelli in this Special Issue.
52 Commission Communication “Regulatory Fitness and Perfor-
mance Programme (REFIT): State of Play and Outlook”,
COM(2014) 368 final, at p. 15.
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IV. Objectives of Ex Ante and Ex Post
Evaluation in the Light of Closing the
Policy Cycle
1. Overview of Objectives
Table 1 provides a comparative overview of the offi-
cially claimed objectives of the EU’s systems of ex
ante and ex post evaluation.53 Column two lists the
official objectives of IIA as set out in the 2009 IIA
Guidelines, while column three provides the four ob-
jectives as set out in the 2013 Draft Evaluation Guide-
lines.54 The four categories of key objectives set out
in column one constitute a common comparative ba-
sis for ex ante and ex post evaluation, based on both
the official documents and the academic literature in
the two fields.55 I distinguish fourmain categories of
key objectives of evaluation, namely: 1) ensuring
soundevidenceand learning;2) accountability, trans-
parency and participation; 3) policy coherence; and
4) reducing the regulatory burden.
Policy documents often assume that these differ-
ent objectives of ex ante and ex post evaluation are
entirely complementary. However, such complemen-
tarity cannot be taken for granted.
Firstly, evenwhen dealingwith ex ante and ex post
evaluation separately, theremaybe tensions between
these objectives. For instance, even though the Euro-
pean Commission tends to present “learning and ac-
countability” as the key objectives of ex post evalua-
tion,56 trying to achieve one objective may work to
the detriment of the other. Based on an extensive
range of interviews, Steven Højlund (in this Special
Issue) shows how the more centrally controlled and
formalised evaluation practice that developed in the
Commission during the 1990s and 2000s focused on
legal and financial accountability, and weakened
rather than strengthened the learning capacity that
was present prior to that period. Notably, too strong
a monitoring to ensure accountability may indeed
stifle the learning processes.
Secondly, while the four identified categories of
objectives are relevant for both ex ante and ex post
evaluation, they are so in different ways. As such, an
automatic fit cannot be assumed when linking ex
ante and ex post evaluation. For instance, an IA sys-
tem aimed mainly at ensuring policy coherence by
coordinating Commission DGs is likely to be less in-
terested in information from ex post assessment than
an IA system that is particularly steered towards re-
ducing the regulatory burden. Or still, an ex post eval-
uation geared particularly towards reducing the reg-
ulatory burdenmay not deliver the best evidence for
an ex ante evaluation that aims at providing the
widest possible evidence basis for new policy initia-
tives.
Hence, setting out the objectives in a comparative
way allows for the addressing of the challenges of an
evaluation culture that aims to close the policy cycle.
I will unpack the challenges relating to each key ob-
jective below table 1.
2. Sound Evidence and Learning: Which
Evidence for whom?
Both ex ante and ex post evaluation are expected to
provide evidence for policy-making. Both the IIA
guidelines and the evaluation guidelines state explic-
itly that they are a decision-support tool,with the aim
53 Claimed objectives do not necessarily correspond with the
(strategic) use of evaluation in practice. See Dunlop et al., “The
many uses of RIA”, supra note 13; and Højlund, “Evaluation use”,
supra note 14; as well as Dunlop and Radaelli in this Special
Issue.
54 Both texts have been chosen as they provide the most compre-
hensive official definition of objectives for each category. For ex
post evaluation I have relied on the 2013 Draft Guidelines, even
if not yet in force, because the 2004 guidelines are clearly out of
date and no longer in line with the new approach developed
since then. For ex ante evaluation I have stuck to the 2009 Guide-
lines, rather than the 2014 Draft IIA guidelines, as they are not yet
in force and do not set out the objectives as clearly as the 2009
guidelines.
55 Ann-Katrin Bäcklund, “Impact assessment in the European Com-
mission - a system with multiple objectives”, 12 Environmental
Science and Policy (2009), pp. 1077 et sqq, Gerard G. Rowe,
“Tools for the control of political and administrative agents:
impact assessment and administrative governance in the Euro-
pean Union” in Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alexander H. Turk
(eds.), EU Administrative Governance (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2006), pp. 448 et sqq,; Michael Scriven, “Beyond Formative
and Summative Evaluation” in Milbrey McLauglin and D.C.
Philips (eds), Evaluation and Education: At Quarter Century (3
edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Frans-Bauke
Van der Meer and Jurian Edelenbos, “Evaluation in multi-actor
policy process: Accountability, learning and co-operation”, 12
Evaluation (2006), pp. 201 et sqq,; Susana Borrás and Steven
Højlund, “Evaluation and policy learning: the learners’ perspec-
tive”, 54 European Journal of Political Research (2015),pp. 99 et
sqq,.
56 Commission Communication “Strengthening the foundations of
smart regulation – improving evaluation”, supra note 6, at p. 2.
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Table 1
EX ANTE (2009 IIA Guidelines) EX POST (2013 Draft Evaluation Guidelines)
Evidence, learning -helps the EU institutions to design better
policies and laws.
A. To provide timely and relevant advice to
decision-making and input to political priori-
-facilitates better-informed decision making
throughout the legislative process.
ty-setting: Evaluation is a decision-support tool.
It does not replace, but aids decision-making,
both at a strategic (planning) level, and at the
level of the design of a new intervention. It aims
to raise the quality of the debate, reinforcing the
principles of Smart Regulation and administra-
tive simplification.
B. Organisational learning: The results of an
evaluation should be used to improve the quali-
ty of an on-going intervention and to prepare
future ones:
-can take a wider look at an intervention and its
environment and identify not just the areas for
improvement but also the positive practices and
achievements which should be widely shared
and if possible duplicated in other areas.
-looks at "unintended" and/or "unexpected" ef-
fects.
Accountability, trans-
parency and participation
-helps to ensure that the principles of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality are respected,
C. Transparency and accountability: EU stake-
holders and citizens have a right to ask the
and to explain why the action being pro- Commission to give an account of what was
posed is necessary and appropriate. done and achieved, not least because tax payers'
-improves the quality of policy proposals by money is being used to develop and fund the
providing transparency on the benefits and various interventions. This entitles citizens,
costs of different policy alternatives. stakeholders and parliamentarians to hold the
-takes into account input from a wide range administration to account and to see more clear-
of external stakeholders, in line with the ly whether previous promises have materialised
Commission's policy of transparency and and if not what the likely reasons were and
openness towards other institutions and
civil society.
what aspects deserve special attention. Trans-
parency can also help to increase trust, as insti-
tutions that are transparent and self-critical tend
to be more trusted than institutions which do
not produce realistic and objective, detailed and
full assessments of the performance of their
actions. By publishing evaluation findings, the
Commission is publicly taking responsibility for
its actions, acknowledging how an intervention
is performing and inviting further feedback.
Coherence and choice of
policy priorities
-ensures early coordination within the Com-
mission.
D. Efficient resource allocation: Resources are
limited and allocation between interventions or
-helps to ensure coherence of Commission even between the separate elements of an inter-
policies and consistency with Treaty objec- vention should be based on prioritisation of
tives (such as the respect for Fundamental unmet societal/stakeholder needs. The final
Rights) and high level objectives (such as allocation may be influenced both by the esti-
the Lisbon or Sustainable Development
strategies).
mated expectations and by any previous experi-
ence in running the same or a similar activity.
Reduce the regulatory bur-
den
-improves the quality of policy proposals by
providing transparency on the benefits and
costs of different policy alternatives and
A. …..reinforcing the principles of Smart Regula-
tion and administrative simplification.
D. Efficient resource allocation
helping to keep EU intervention as simple
and effective as possible.
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of aiding but not replacing decision-making. In the
academic literature, the use of knowledge in policy-
making has often been framed in terms of (policy)
learning. Policy learning can be instrumental (how
to improve a particular policy), social (leading to
moreprofoundparadigmatic changesofpolicy ideas)
and political (when learning affects power and influ-
ence).57 Dunlop and Radaelli propose a broad defin-
ition of learning as “the updating of beliefs based on
lived or witnessed experiences, analysis or social in-
teraction”.58
The Evaluation Guidelines talk explicitly about or-
ganisational learning, which can take several forms.
The Guidelines suggest it can be used to improve on-
going intervention (which is often the casewith cycli-
cal expenditure and programme management) as
well as future action. While organisational learning
on expenditure and programme management is of-
ten reflexive within a small circle of policy officers
dealing directly with the particular programme, the
Guidelines also suggest a process of organisational
learning through the exchange of best practices
among policy officers in different areas.
In contrast, the IIA Guidelines do not explicitly
use the concept of learning, although “better in-
formed decision-making throughout the legislative
process” suggests some level of reflexivity. For both
the ex ante and ex post guidelines, providing advice
to decision-making is not framed in terms of learn-
ing;which seems to suggest thatorganisational learn-
ing is conceived to take place at the level of policy of-
ficers, while advice to political decision-makers is not
labelled as learning.
The key question, though, is not whether the
process is explicitly labelled as “learning”,59 but
rather which type of evidence both ex ante and ex
post evaluation are expected to deliver, and whether
the evidence gathered allows for a reflexive process
in which ex post evidence feeds into ex ante assess-
ment.60
Several elements of “misfit” can be identified be-
tween the existing systemsof ex ante and ex post eval-
uation, whichmakes reflexivity within the policy cy-
cle challenging.
First of all it is worth remembering that, while the
newapproach toevaluationstresses the linkbetween
ex post evaluation and the EU’s system of IIAs, ex
post evidence is only one part of the evidence basis
for ex ante impact assessments. IIAs aim to assess
future impacts, in particular economic, social and
environmental impacts. Different sources of evi-
dence will be used for that, namely internal and ex-
ternal studies, information gathered via European
agencies and advisory committees, as well as consul-
tation with stakeholders. Evidence about what hap-
pened with the implementation of previous initia-
tives is only one part of the equation. At the same
time, ex post evaluation is not only geared at feed-
ing information into the system of IIAs. Besides oth-
er objectives of ex post evaluation, such as account-
ability (see below), evidence may be gathered in
function of (financial) programme or project assess-
ment that is not necessarily linked to the IIA sys-
tem.61
Secondly, the “misfit” between the ex post evalua-
tion system and IIA system is partially due to the dif-
ferent legal requirements regardingwhen an IIA and
an ex post evaluation need to be adopted. IIAs are re-
quired for legislative proposals, as well as non-leg-
islative proposals (such as white papers or expendi-
ture programmes) which set out future policies, and
implementing measures with likely significant im-
pacts. Completion of an IIA for the latter is at the dis-
cretion of the Commission. Legal requirements for
ex post evaluation are set at different levels. Article
138 TFEU requires the Commission to adopt an an-
nual evaluation report on theUnion’s finances based
on the results achieved. The Financial Regulation
sets additional requirements for expenditure policy,
in particular for interventions where spending ex-
57 Claudio M. Radaelli and Claire A. Dunlop, “Learning in the
European Union: theoretical lenses and meta-theory”, 20 Journal
of European Public Policy, pp. 923 et sqq,, at p. 923.
58 Claire A. Dunlop and Claudio M .Radaelli, “Systematising Policy
Learning: From Monolith to Dimensions”, 61 Political Studies
(2013), pp. 599 et sqq,, at p. 599.
59 The academic literature clearly relies on a broader conceptual-
ization of policy learning than the official documents, and (ex
ante) evidence providing to policy makers is considered part of
it.
60 Focusing on the type of evidence available and the use of such
evidence in policy-making may also be a less tricky research
strategy than trying to identify these processes as learning
processes. Although Dunlop and Radaelli suggest several avenues
in policy learning research (based on an analysis of the existing
literature), they also seem to indicate that research framed in
terms of knowledge utilisation may be the most promising one.
Dunlop and Radaelli, “Systematising Policy Learning”, supra note
58, at p. 615.
61 For the relationship between different types of evidence and the
different goals of ex post programme evaluation see Marielle
Berriet-Solliec, Pierre Labarthe, and Catherine Laurent, “Goals of
evaluation and types of evidence”, 20 Evaluation, (2014), pp. 195
et sqq,
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ceeds 5 million €.62 Additional legal requirements
for monitoring and reporting are often set out in Eu-
ropean secondary legislation, including for non-ex-
penditure policy. However, while expenditure pro-
grammes and projects have a clear period of dura-
tion around which a programme of ex ante, mid-
term, final and ex post evaluation is built, this estab-
lishedpattern is lacking for regulatory interventions.
Although some regulatory interventions have sunset
clauses, to which a requirement for retrospective
evaluation canbeattached,most regulatory interven-
tion has no “expiry date”. Such interventions may
still include monitoring obligations but their scope
is highly variable and may refer to the entire regula-
tory intervention or a specific part of it. There is no
inherent link, in either content or timing, between
such monitoring obligations and IIA for new regu-
latory actions.
Thirdly, (partially as a result of the legal require-
ments) there is a misfit between the type of informa-
tion gathered through ex post assessment and the in-
formation needed for ex ante assessment. Long fo-
cused on expenditure programmes, ex post evalua-
tion is particularly geared towards the provision of
information on the cost effectiveness of financial in-
terventions.With respect to regulatory intervention,
systematic information is mainly limited to compli-
ance reports, particularly the provision of informa-
tion on the transposition of directives, while assess-
ment of policy implementation is ad hoc and not in
depth. Moreover, even when ex post evaluation pro-
vides in depth assessment of implementation, it will
be in relation to the objectives (or part of them) set
out in the initial policymeasure. Thismay not be suf-
ficient to ensure broad policy learning to guide new
initiatives (with potentially divergent objectives).
Moreover, the system of IIAs requires the systemat-
ic ex ante assessment of economic, environmental
and social impacts of new initiatives. The expost eval-
uation system instead does not require a systematic
assessment of initiatives on their economic, environ-
mental and social consequences. The IIA system thus
misses out on what could be a very valuable assess-
ment of past practice on the three criteria specifical-
ly required for ex ante analysis.
Fourthly, as several contributions to this special is-
sue show,63 one of the key problems of ex post eval-
uation is to clearly identify the original objectives of
an initiative and the benchmarks against which eval-
uation is possible. The systematic use of IIA should
help in this regard, since IIAs need to set out the “gen-
eral”, “specific” and “operational” objectives of a new
initiative. “General” refers to Treaty-based goals, “spe-
cific” to how the new policy would contribute to a
Treaty-based goal, and “operational” to specific tar-
gets anddeliverables to reach that goal.64The require-
ment of the IIA guidelines to set out indicators for
ex post evaluation is also a welcome help in this re-
gard. However, while most IIAs set out general and
specific objectives, many fail to set out operational
objectives,65 making ex post measuring particularly
difficult. Nearly all IIAs include a section regarding
ex post monitoring and evaluation, but only about
half include specific indicators, although the trend
for inclusion ispositive.66Also, so far there isnoavail-
able data on whether proposed ex post evaluation in-
dicators set out in IIAs definitely make it to the final
proposal and whether they are de facto used in ret-
rospective appraisal.
Fifthly, an additional complication results from
the fact that several evaluations with different scope,
assessing different objectives or indicators of the
same initiative (orofmultiple similar initiatives)may
be adopted in parallel or partially in parallel follow-
ing different life cycles.67 Although the Commis-
sion’s initiative to program evaluations more strate-
gically andmore visibly is a valuable step in the right
direction, it remains a challenge to gather all relevant
ex post information for new ex ante assessment, es-
pecially as the new approach aims in particular at
broad policy learning (rather than simply project or
programme learning).
Finally, there is an imbalance in experience and
available evidence regarding ex ante and ex post eval-
62 Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and
repealing Council of 25 October 2012, Regulation (EC, Euratom)
No 1605/2002, at Chapter 7, Article 30.
63 Emanuela Bozzini and Jo Hunt, and Lut Mergaert and Rachel
Minto in this Special Issue.
64 Commission, “Impact Assessment Guidelines”, SEC(2009) 92.
65 According to a CEPS database of all IIAs adopted between 2003
and 2009, only about 43% of IIAs included operational objec-
tives. The database created by the Centre for European Policy
Studies under the supervision of Andrea Renda is not publicly
available, but these data were quoted in Giacomo Luchetta,
“Impact assessment and the policy cycle in the EU”, 3 European
Journal of Risk Regulation (2012), pp. 561 et sqq,, at p. 568.
66 Luchetta, “IA and the policy cycle”, ibid., at p. 573.
67 Emanuela Bozzini and Jo Hunt, and Lut Mergaert and Rachel
Minto in this Special Issue.
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uation in different DGs. Graph 1 compares the total
number of IIAs and evaluation reports per DG over
a four year period (2010-2013). The data were gath-
ered from the Commission’s IIA and evaluationweb-
sites, but come with a caveat. While a full list of IIAs
is published by the Commission,68 the public “data-
base on evaluation files”69 does not systematically
cover all evaluation reports. More particularly it fo-
cuses on external evaluation reports and tends not to
include evaluation reports done entirely within the
Commission. Yet, as about 80% of the Commission’s
evaluation work is outsourced, the available data al-
low some comparative conclusions between ex ante
and ex post evaluation to be drawn.
Graph 1 shows considerable variation between
DGs regarding their use of ex ante and ex post evalu-
ation. Not surprisingly, DGs whose primary role is in
expenditure policies (like DGs AGRI, DEV, REGIO
andRTD) adopt a high number of ex post evaluations
but are modest in their use of IIAs. Vice versa, DGs
with primarily regulatory tasks (such as DGs ENER,
ENV, andparticularlyMARKT)have amuch stronger
tradition of adopting IIAs rather than ex post evalu-
ations. This is not to suggest that an encompassing
approach to evaluation would necessarily imply that
DGs ought to adopt a similar number of ex post eval-
uations and IIAs, and that all DGs should converge
to similar practice. However, the graph is indicative
of the challenges ahead as it illustrates a misfit be-
tween the evidence available through ex post evalu-
ation and the inclination for new (regulatory) inter-
vention. With some exceptions (such as DG SANCO,
and DG ENTR) DGswhich adoptmany IIAs and thus
propose many new initiatives tend to have relative-
ly limited expertise of and evidence from ex post eval-
uation at their disposal.
Itmay be concluded that, in terms of evidence and
learning, the EU still has some way to go to make ex
ante and ex post evaluation “fit”. So far there is little
academic research on whether the evidence made
available in this process actually leads to learning. A
recent study by Boras and Højlund shows how only
two types of actors, namely programme units and ex-
ternal evaluators, learned from three expenditure
programme evaluations, and that such learning tend-
ed to be incremental rather than path-breaking.70 It
remains an open question whether policy learning
also occurs in relation to regulatory intervention, and
in particular whether it happens at a higher political
level in relation to a broader regulatory framework
68 Commission, “2014 impact assessment (IA) reports/IAB opinions ,
available on the Internet at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/
impact/ia_carried_out/cia_2014_en.htm (last accessed on 13
January 2015).
69 Commission, “Search evaluation results”, supra note 39.
70 Borrás and Højlund, “Evaluation and policy learning”, supra note
55.
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(in a way as promoted by the new approach to eval-
uation). The EU’s new approach to policy evaluation
seems based on a general assumption that ex post in-
formation will contribute to the sound evidence ba-
sis for ex ante assessment of new action. However, it
has to be acknowledged that different types of evi-
dence lead to learning for different types of actors.
Hence, evidence from programme and project eval-
uation can lead to “administrative” learning at the
level of policy officers. Yet, in order to ensure broad-
er policy learning on regulatory intervention, differ-
ent evidence is required – which to date is scarce –
and such evidence has to reach different policy ac-
tors. Specifically, it is not enough that information
reaches project and programme officers, but evi-
dence provided by research departments dealing
with ex post evaluation and IIAs must also reach
those departments responsible for drafting policy.
Moreover, the evidence gathering process may be
geared towards objectives other than ensuring the
most sound evidence basis for policy-making, such
asensuringaccountability, policy coherenceor reduc-
ing the regulatory burden.
2. Accountability, Transparency and
Participation: Who Are and Should be
the Actors in Evaluation?
According to Ian Sanderson, the mushrooming of
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in public
governance is signof aprocess inwhichgovernments
are turning to evidence of performance for legitima-
cy since it is no longer guaranteed solely by democ-
ratic political processes.71 Accountability, trans-
parency and participation therefore often appear as
objectives of ex ante and ex post evaluation systems,
but in different ways.
Accountability is often identified (together with
learning) as the key objective of ex post evaluation,
both in the literature and in official documents.72Ac-
countability has always been core to retrospective
evaluation, but it can take different forms.73 As long
as ex post evaluation is mainly about auditing, and
financial and legal compliance, it is more about “ac-
counting” than “accounting for”. What is important
is ensuring compliance with the rules by having a
threat of sanction rather than political “accounting
for” vis-à-vis a broader public or political principal,
although it does provide parliament with a means of
political control. As evaluation turns increasingly to
performance evaluation, it becomesmore ameans of
democratic deliberation allowing “citizens, stake-
holders and parliamentarians to hold the administra-
tion to account”.74 This explains the Commission’s
efforts since its 2007Communication toensure trans-
parency of evaluation with respect to the other EU
institutions (the Parliament in particular) as well as
towards citizens. As it states in the 2013 draft guide-
lines, such transparency can increase trust. Howev-
er, the focus is on transparency of the outcome of
evaluation: by “publishing evaluation findings, the
Commission is publicly taking responsibility for its
actions, acknowledging how an intervention is per-
forming and inviting further feedback”.75 The invita-
tion for further feedback also suggests a participato-
ry approach to evaluation, yet, only after evaluation
reports have been adopted. “The purpose of evalua-
tions, namely to promote accountability/transparen-
cy and organisational learning, can only be achieved
if the information produced by such evaluations
reaches those to whom we are accountable to [sic]
(general public, parliaments, etc.) or certain interme-
diaries (journalists) and thosewho should learn from
the results. All evaluation reports of high quality
should therefore be disseminated in a manner suit-
ed to the different audiences. Active discussion and
debate on these findings should be encouraged.”76
The central database of evaluation files available on
the Commission’s evaluation webpage is a key tool
in this regard. To date this database has mainly been
limited toproviding the evaluation reports. TheCom-
mission proposes in the new draft guidelines to pub-
lish (in addition to the main evaluation findings) al-
so the evaluation mandate and a Commission re-
sponse regarding how it will take up these findings.
Even if this were realised, these transparency mea-
sures functionmainly as anaccountability tool,while
71 Ian Sanderson, “Evaluation, policy learning, and evidence-based
policy-making”, 80 Public Administration (2002), pp. 1 et sqq., at
p,2.
72 Scriven, “Beyond Formative and Summative Evaluation”, supra
note 55; Van der Meer and Edelenbos, “Evaluation in multi-
actor policy process”, supra note 55.
73 See also Steven Højlund in this Special Issue.
74 Commission, “Public Consultation on Commission Guidelines for
Evaluation”, supra note 19, see table 1 above.
75 Commission, “Public Consultation on Commission Guidelines for
Evaluation”, supra note 19, see table 1 above.
76 Commission, “Public Consultation on Commission Guidelines for
Evaluation”, supra note 19.
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participation is conceptualised mainly as an ex post
process to ensure such accountability rather than as
an ex ante process ensuring input in evaluation. This
fits with a more traditional technical-rational model
of evaluation in which evaluation ensures neutral
gathering of evidence, which is then presented to po-
litical decision-makers to reflect on new action and
to the broader public to ensure accountability. How-
ever, the newevaluation guidelines also include hints
towards a more post-positivist and more participato-
ry approach to the evaluation process itself. Under
the title “who contributes information to evalua-
tion?”, the draft evaluation guidelines state: “Mem-
ber States, stakeholders, academics, citizens and a
wide range of other parties are involved by provid-
ing data and opinion about interventions and wider
policies. By contributing to, reading and reacting to
evaluation reports, they provide further direct input
to the decision making system. They play an impor-
tant part in testing findings and driving independent
and impartial evaluations” (stress added).77 Howev-
er, the current evaluation system, as well as the new
guidelines, remain very modest about how such par-
ticipation should be organised. The publication of an
annual andmulti-annual evaluation plan (see above)
suggests stakeholders may have a role to play during
ex post evaluation. However, any concrete mecha-
nisms to ensure such participation are missing.
The balance between accountability, transparency
and participation is very different in relation to ex
ante evaluation. Accountability is less of a core con-
cept of ex ante than of ex post evaluation, and also
the 2009 IIA Guidelines do not use the concept ex-
plicitly. However, openness and transparency are of-
ten key features of ex ante evaluation. Regulatory im-
pact assessments were introduced in several coun-
tries during the 1990s in the context of a move to-
wards more “open government”.78 Openness, or
transparency,79has two dimensions in relation to im-
pact assessments. By way of impact assessments, a
regulatory authority has to justify its action, which
implies an understanding of openness similar to the
idea of accountability. At the same time, ensuring a
transparent impact assessment process facilitates
participation of stakeholders in ex ante evaluation.
These two dimensions have been present from the
start of the EU’s system of IIA. The IIA system was
set on track during the early 2000s, in the context of
both the Lisbon Strategy and theWhite Paper on Eu-
ropean Governance.80 The use of IIA as a way to
oblige the Commission to provide justification for its
initiatives fits the Lisbon Strategy’s concern with
making the EU more competitive and tackling the
regulatory burden. At the same time, the White Pa-
per’s concern with more open and participatory Eu-
ropean governance provided a second argument to
use IIA as a way to make the reasoning and motiva-
tions of the Commission more transparent, while at
the same time linking IIA to participatory processes.
As table 1 above shows, also the 2009 IIA guidelines
state clearly that the objective of IIAs is to ensure jus-
tification of an intervention (in terms of subsidiari-
ty, proportionality, appropriateness, and the benefits
and costs of different policy alternatives), as well as
to take into account input from a wide range of ex-
ternal stakeholders. The 2009 guidelines provide fur-
ther indications about how suchparticipation should
be organised, requiring in particular that the 2002
Commission Standards and Principles of Consulta-
tion81 should be respected in this context. The estab-
lishment of the system of IIAs has also gone hand in
hand with an increased use by the Commission of
online consultations, although there is no complete
fit between the twoprocesses.82Moreover, actual par-
ticipation patterns in IIAs suggest that the process is
more aimed at ensuring policy coherence (see below)
than at ensuring the broadest possible participation
of stakeholders.83 Nevertheless, the idea to organise
77 Commission, “Public Consultation on Commission Guidelines for
Evaluation”, supra note 19, at p. 25.
78 Claudio M. Radaelli, “Whither better regulation for the Lisbon
agenda?”, 14 Journal of European Public Policy (2007), pp. 190 et
sqq,, at p. 192.
79 There are sometimes (subtle) differences between the two con-
cepts as they are used in official documents. Yet, due to limits of
space I use them here as synonyms, as is the case in many official
documents. For a more nuanced view, see Alberto Alemanno,
“Unpacking the principle of openness in EU law: transparency,
participation and democracy”, 39 European Law Review (2014),
pp. 72 et sqq,; and Stijn Smismans, “Regulating interest group
participation in the European Union: Changing Paradigms be-
tween transparency and representation”, 39 European Law Re-
view (2014), pp. 470 et sqq,
80 Claudio M. Radaelli, “Whither better regulation”, supra note 78.
81 Commission Communication “Towards a reinforced culture of
consultation and dialogue - General principles and minimum
standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commis-
sion”, COM(2002)704.
82 Still many IIAs do not make use of online consultations, while not
all online consultations are used in the context of IIAs. See
Emanuela Bozzini and Stijn Smismans, “More inclusive European
governance through impact assessments?”, Comparative Euro-
pean Politics, advance online publication, 9 March, 2015,
doi:10.1057/cep. 2015.11.
83 Ibid.
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evaluation as a participatory process is much more
enshrined in the ex ante than in the ex post evalua-
tion system.
This different approach to participation relates to
a broader question about who are supposed to be the
key actors of ex ante and ex post evaluation and
whether evaluators should be “independent”.
Independence is akeyargumentwhenexposteval-
uation is focused on accountability, particularly fi-
nancial and legal accountability. Within the EU’s in-
stitutional set-up the Court of Auditors ensures such
independence from the Commission in relation to
the auditing process. However, the argument about
independence extends to most of the EU’s ex post
evaluation system. About 80%of the EU’s evaluation
work is outsourced to external consultancies. This is
due to an issue of resources but also based on the be-
lief that evaluationwould be less biased if outsourced
to external evaluators than if the Commission as-
sessed its own action, although it has to be acknowl-
edged that the Commission does not entirely lose
control over retrospective evaluation if outsourced
since it is the Commission which defines the man-
date for external evaluation.
The approach is very different in relation to ex
ante assessment. Although one finds arguments in
the literature in favor of external “independent” ex
ante assessment (particularly as a way to control reg-
ulators too keen to act) the EU has not gone this way.
It has solidly chosen to organise the IIA system in-
ternally within the Commission, although it relies
on external sources and documents. Even the quali-
ty insurance mechanism of the IIA system, namely
the Impact Assessment Board, is organised internal-
lywithin theCommission. The choice to organise the
IIA within the Commission can be understood by
the more political nature of ex ante evaluation com-
pared to ex post evaluation. It is inherently linked
with reflecting on different policy objectives and op-
tions for new policy intervention. The 2009 IIA
Guidelines therefore aim at a balance between gath-
ering “objective” information and providing a pic-
ture of the interests at stake. An IIA is expected to
provide a balanced overview of available scientific
views and expert data, as well as ensuring consulta-
tion with “all relevant target groups”. The latter
comes with the warning that DGs should ensure
“peer-reviewing, benchmarking with other studies
andsensitivityanalysis” toguarantee “the robustness
of results” when data are received from stakehold-
ers. The 2014 Draft IIA Guidelinesmention “compre-
hensive”, “evidence-based”, “unbiased” and “consid-
ering a wide and balanced range of stakeholders’
views” as fundamental principles of the IIA system.
However, organising ex ante evaluation within the
Commission includes the risk that IIAs are mainly
used by the Commission to justify its preferred pol-
icy option.84 At the same time, organising the evi-
dence gathering function within the bureaucracy fa-
cilitates learning.
From this perspective, the objective of an encom-
passing cyclical approach to evaluationwhichwould
engender learning raises several questions for ex
ante and ex post evaluation systems which so far
have been based on very different ideas of indepen-
dence and participation. Firstly, focusing on ensur-
ing independence of ex post evaluation may not be
the best solution to ensuring that ex post results feed
back into the policy-making process. Independence
is definitely required to ensure financial accountabil-
ity, but may be less appropriate if the aim is policy
learning, in particular for regulatory intervention.
At the same time, strengthening the internal evalu-
ation function of the Commission is not in itself a
guarantee for such cyclical impact, as one would al-
so need to ensure that evaluation units and IIA units
do not operate in isolation from each other. More-
over, even when IIA and ex post evaluation are done
by the same unit, there is no guarantee that such a
research department will have the ability to effec-
tively influence new proposals drafted in the policy
department.
Secondly, amore participatory approach to ex post
evaluation would not only provide valuable informa-
tion for retrospective evaluationbut also create a con-
tinuum in the broader set of actors involved both ex
post and ex ante, and thus facilitate the flow of ideas.
However, this raises a wider question about who is
expected to organise such broader participation. The
external consultancies involved in ex post evaluation
may not have the experience and capacity to organ-
ise such participation, and their know-how and
methodologymaybe focused onmorenarrowassess-
ments,whether financialor cost-benefit assessments.
Moreover, wider assessments, both in terms of objec-
tives and actors involved,make the process inherent-
ly more political, again raising issues of whether
84 See also Dunlop and Radaelli in this Special Issue.
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theseconsultanciesare the rightplace toprovide such
an assessment.
Thirdly, the more political nature of the type of
cyclical policy level learning foreseen by the new ap-
proach, suggests that a more important role should
be envisaged for theEuropeanParliament (EP) in this
process. The EP’s role in evaluation should not be
limited to reading ex post reports to sanction the bud-
get. As evaluation is increasingly performance eval-
uation assumed to feed back into new policy initia-
tives, the EP should be in a position to judge on the
availabledata andhowthese feedback intonewCom-
mission action. The creation of a Directorate for Im-
pact Assessment and European Added Value in Jan-
uary 2012 has been an important step in the devel-
opment of such a capacity, although so far its action
has focused on the IIA system. In 2014, the Secretary
General of the EP therefore also decided to create a
unit on ex post impact assessment and a unit on pol-
icy performance appraisal.85
Finally, policy evaluation may be too heavily per-
ceived as a European level game, involving in par-
ticular the Commission and an industry of consul-
tancies which operate mainly as European or inter-
national businesses. The reality of evaluation in ex-
penditure policy, however, shows amulti-level game,
with the EU setting important requirements in terms
of reporting and evaluation at the national level. The
latter, though, is perceived by Member States as
strongly controlling and as not facilitating in terms
of learning.86The challenge is even bigger in relation
to regulatory policy, where there is a clear gap in ap-
propriate infrastructure to gather sufficient and com-
parable data to feed back from the national to the Eu-
ropean level. At the same time, part of the existing
EU institutional set-up which can contribute to the
evaluation data regarding what happens at a nation-
al level, namely (some of) the European agencies, ap-
pears only weakly related to the ex post and ex ante
evaluation system.
3. Coherence and Choice of Political
Priorities
Both ex ante and ex post evaluation are assumed to
contribute to policy coherence.87 In linewith the pre-
dominantexpenditure traditionofexpostevaluation,
the 2013 draft guidelines on evaluation refer to poli-
cy coherence in terms of “efficient resource alloca-
tion”. Coherence is about choosing the most efficient
resource allocation based on past experience of the
same action or similar action. The comparative basis
is limited to the latter rather than referring to the
overall objectives of the EU. The aim is internal co-
herence, that is coherence between each policy and
its objective(s),88 or, most broadly, comparing with
other policy initiatives closely related to it. Ex ante
evaluation instead aims also at external coherence,
ensuring consistency of policy action with the mul-
titude of available EU Treaty objectives and other
broad EU normative frameworks such as the Europe
2020 Strategy. IIAs have to set the objectives of new
intervention in the light of these normative frame-
works. Moreover, the systematic screening of eco-
nomic, social and environmental impacts also steers
policy-making in a similar direction, although there
is a risk of “steering overload” as the suggested “check
list” for assessing impacts is getting ever longer, go-
ing from assessing systematically impacts on funda-
mental rights, to suggestions to assess, among oth-
ers, territorial impacts, competitiveness, and impacts
on micro-enterprises.89
Ex ante and ex post evaluation thus have clearly
different benchmarks for coherence. The ex ante
process is also better institutionally organised to en-
sure coherence by way of the obligatory creation of
an IA Steering Group, bringing together officials
fromall DGs thatmay be concerned. SteeringGroups
for ex post evaluation tend to be more narrowly or-
ganised, although they can include external actors,
such as external consultants, but generally are less
cross-DG than IA Steering Groups.
In the light of a reflexive approach to evaluation,
it may be asked whether ex post evaluation can de-
liver more to ensure policy coherence. Ex post evalu-
ation is based on assessing outcome in relation to the
85 European Parliament, “European Parliament Work in the fields of
ex ante impact assessment and European added value. Activity
Report for June 2012-June 2014”, European Parliamentary Re-
search Service.
86 Mendez and Bachtler, “Administrative reform”, supra note 3.
87 The concept of policy coherence has particularly been used by
both the OECD and the EU in relation to development policy. It is
used here in a more general way to refer to the objective of
ensuring coherence within a policy intervention or sector (inter-
nal coherence), or ensuring coherence of a policy intervention
with other policy objectives of the polity (external coherence).
88 Luchetta, “IA and the policy cycle”, supra note 65, at p. 564.
89 Commission, “Impact Assessment: Key documents”, available on
the Internet at <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/key
_docs/key_docs_en.htm> (last accessed on 21 January 2015).
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objectives set at the origin of an initiative, not in re-
lation to wider EU objectives. However, policy coher-
ence might be improved if ex ante evaluation relied
onmore ex post data assessing policy outcomes in re-
lation to broader EU policy frameworks and “gover-
nance architectures”90 such as Europe 2020. This
could be done by increasingly setting the objectives
of new policy initiatives in light of these broader
frameworks, so they could also be assessed on this
basis at the level of ex post evaluation. Or ex post eval-
uation may engage de officio in such broader appre-
ciation, whichmay suit an evaluation trend that goes
from compliance to performance assessment. How-
ever, this has two significant inherent risks. Ex post
evaluation is a difficult and costly task even for pol-
icy initiatives with relatively narrow objectives, par-
ticularly if the aim is performance evaluation and al-
so the assessment of benefits and not only costs. In-
deed, the broader the objectives of an initiative, the
bigger the challenge. Moreover, there is a risk that a
broad evaluationmandatemay be hijacked by assess-
ing technocratically set benchmarks, rather than
clearly set Treaty-based objectives formulated by the
legislator. Elsewhere we have analysed that there is
a tendency in the IIA system to steer policy-making
into the direction of rather technocratically framed
benchmarks set out, for instance, in the Smart Reg-
ulation and Europe 2020 Strategies rather than in
function of the EU’s constitutional values set out in
the Treaties.91 As the next section will illustrate, the
encompassing approach to evaluation is likely to
strengthen that process.
4. Reducing the Regulatory Burden
Policy intentions to reduce the regulatory burden are
often a key, or even the key driver for the introduc-
tion of a regulatory impact assessment system. Also
at EU level this concern has been at the origin of the
creation of the system of IIA, which should be placed
in the context of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy which
aimed to make Europe the most competitive knowl-
edge based economy in the world. As mentioned
above, at the same time it was inspired by concerns
about participatory and legitimate governance, ex-
pressed in the context of the White Paper on Euro-
pean Governance. The IIA system thus created was
more participatory than in most countries, while
aimed towards an integrated assessment including
assessment of economic, social and environmental
impacts. These reflect the original mixed values of
the Lisbon Strategy, not only aiming at competitive-
ness but equally social cohesion and sustainability.
However, the revision of the Lisbon Strategy in
2005 led to an ever stronger focus on competitive-
ness. AsRadaelli has argued,92 as a consequence, con-
cerns about “quantity” rather than “quality” were
brought to the foreground of the Better Regulation
agenda and the IIA system. The 2009 IIA guidelines
introduced specific sections on “administrative bur-
dens” and on “simplification potential”, while a sep-
arate “competitiveness proofing toolkit” was intro-
duced as further guidance to the guidelines in 2012.93
The initial history of expost evaluation in theCom-
mission has been driven to a lesser extent by con-
cerns about regulatory burden. Although it has al-
ways had a strong “value for money” dimension, fo-
cus was on ex post accountability of expenditure pol-
icy. However, as argued above, the new approach to
evaluation (extending ex post evaluation to regulato-
ry action and focusing on the policy cycle) has turned
the “value for money” argument from an ex post ac-
countability mechanism into a tool to decide on the
desirability of future action. It is the Smart Regula-
tion (2010) agenda and in particular the REFIT pro-
gramme (2012) (with a strong focus on reducing the
regulatory burden) which have propelled evaluation
higher up the political agenda. Not surprisingly, the
most important new evaluation tools so far (namely
fitness checks and CCA) are aimed particularly at ad-
dressing theREFITobjectives.ThenewJunckerCom-
mission has further propelled evaluation to the top
of the political agenda by considering it a key tool to
address what appears to be its number one political
priority: ensuring that the EU is “big on big things
90 Susana Borrás and Claudio M. Radaelli, “The politics of gover-
nance architectures: creation, change and effects of the EU
Lisbon Strategy”, 18 Journal of European Public Policy (2011),
pp. 463 et sqq,
91 Stijn Smismans and Rachel Minto (forthcoming), “Are integrated
impact assessments the way forward for mainstreaming in the
EU?”. See also Dunlop and Radaelli in this special issue, who
point to the potentially normatively disturbing finding that IAs
develop narratives about values and identities, which are thus
developed within bureaucratic documents instead of within
constitutional discussions.
92 Radaelli, “Whither better regulation”, supra note 78.
93 Commission staff working document “Operational guidance for
assessing impacts on sectoral competitiveness within the commis-
sion impact assessment system. A "Competitiveness Proofing"
Toolkit for use in Impact Assessments”, SEC(2012) 91 final.
EJRR 1|2015 25Symposium on Policy Evaluation in the EU
and small on small things”. Promising “a new start”
and “making a political priority of lightening the reg-
ulatory load”,94 the first action of the new Commis-
sion has been to propose a particularly thin work
plan, listing only 23 initiatives for 2015, compared to
an average of 130 new initiatives each year under the
Barroso Commission.95 In this context, the Commis-
sion not only presented a list of 80 acts for withdraw-
al, but equally a list announcing nine new fitness
checks, 44 evaluations of individual regulatory acts,
and three new CCAs.96
Hence, at the highest political level, evaluation
seems to have become primarily a tool to make the
EU thinner, based on an assumption that this would
be the best way to tackle rising euro-scepticism.
There are several aspects of the current evaluation
system which strengthen this push towards using it
mainly as an instrument to address the regulatory
burden, rather than as a learning system aimed at
gathering the best evidence for policy-making in the
broadest possible way.
Firstly, unlike impact assessments, which are re-
quired to assess the economic, social and environ-
mental impacts of new initiatives (together with im-
pacts on regulatory burden), the general evaluation
guidelines do not set specific substantive objectives
for ex post assessment. Ex post assessment always re-
lates to the initial objectives of a policy intervention,
which will have to be identified by the evaluation of-
ficer on a case by case basis. However, the new eval-
uation guidelines set out one priority which needs to
be assessedmore generally, namely “where appropri-
ate, evaluationof regulation should include anassess-
ment of administrative burden, simplificationpoten-
tial, impacts on small andmedium-sized enterprises,
and theglobal competitiveness ofEUbusiness aspart
of the analysis of ‘efficiency’”.97
Second, although the Smart Regulation Commu-
nication states that individual ex post assessments
and fitness checks are complementary,98 the in-
creased attentionuponmore comprehensive sectoral
evaluation includes the risk of turning evaluation in-
creasingly into a function of the agenda to reduce
regulatory burden. While individual policy initia-
tives (whether regulations or programmes) can be
clearly assessed on their initial objectives, identify-
ing the initial objectives of a broader regulatory
framework is more complex, thus making it more
likely for evaluations to focus on externally set eval-
uation objectives such as impact on administrations,
small and medium-sized enterprises, etc.
Thirdly, evaluation is complicated and costly, in
particular if an assessment of multiple and broad ob-
jectives has to be made. Moreover, measuring bene-
fits ismore difficult thanmeasuring costs. Therefore,
it may be that the evaluation systemwill be used par-
ticularly in function of one key objective, namely re-
ducing the regulatory burden, with a focus on mea-
suring short-term costs.
V. Conclusion
The EU’s intention to create an “evaluation culture”
based on a cyclical understanding of policy-making
that links ex post and ex ante evaluation and applies
to all types of policy interventionbringswith itmany
challenges. In relation to expenditure policy, the EU
has a well-established tradition of cyclical interven-
tion at both programme and project level, including
ex ante financial evaluation, mid-term and evalua-
tion, followed by a new budget cycle. However, even
in these cases, there remain multiple challenges, re-
lated to timing (such as ex post evaluation coming
too late to inspire the next programme round), the
difficulty of identifying the initial objectives of ini-
tiatives in order to assess them, or the changing na-
ture of these objectives over time. The problems are
exacerbated when evaluation is aimed towards per-
formance rather than compliance, particularlywhen
there is a shift from project and programme level
evaluation to a broader political evaluation of the
regulatory framework. There are many misfits be-
tween the key objectives of ex post and ex ante eval-
uation and the way they have been institutionalised,
going from the gap between the type of evidence
gathered ex post and the one needed for ex ante as-
sessment; the lack of established time frames and
the absence of a cyclical process in relation to regu-
latory intervention; to a different focus on account-
94 Commission Communication “Commission Work Programme
2015. A new start”, COM(2014) 910 final, at p. 3.
95 European Voice, “The Companion to the European Commission”,
February 2015, at p. 24.
96 Commission Communication “Commission Work Programme
2015”, supra note 94, at Annex 3.
97 Commission, “Public Consultation on Commission Guidelines for
Evaluation”, supra note 19, at p. 39.
98 Commission Communication “Smart Regulation in the European
Union”, supra note 25, at p. 4.
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ability versus learning, and different expectations
about the appropriate actors to be involved in the
process.
With its focus on the policy cycle, the new ap-
proach to evaluation seems inspired by a strong com-
mitment to strengthening a solid evidence basis for
European policy-making, whether expenditure or
regulatory intervention. However, the challenges are
so considerable that it may be that efforts focus on
ensuring that ex post evaluation provides evidence
for ex ante assessment of new action in relation to
one particular objective, namely reducing the regu-
latory burden. The context in which the new ap-
proach to evaluation has developed, and the concrete
actions taken so far, strongly confirm the likelihood
of such a development.
